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1. Introduction 
 
A rich body of evidence suggests that psychological biases affect financial decision making. These 
biases are usually modeled as being inherent to the individual, and arising from generic decision-theoretic 
errors such as overestimating small probabilities or underweighting certain types of information signals. 
Much less attention has been devoted to the effects of more specific incorrect ideas about how the world 
works, which an individual may or may not choose to adopt. For example, the sometimes-popular theory 
that “land is the best investment,” if adopted, could potentially induce mistaken probability assessments, 
overinvestment in land, and overpricing. Such effects result from the specific idea rather than some general 
information-processing error. Indeed, someone with the same inherent cognitive biases might, given 
exposure to different people and ideas, adopt the opposite conclusion about whether land is a good 
investment.  
In contrast, in most existing behavioral finance models, such as those based upon overconfidence, 
limited attention, cumulative prospect theory, and the representativeness heuristic, inherent cognitive 
biases automatically induce errors in assessing probabilities, where these errors depend only on the 
probability distributions of the gambles investors face and the information signals about these gambles that 
they receive.1 Such models do not incorporate the realistic fact that people adopt specific theories about of 
how the world works. There is surprisingly little direct empirical testing of the proposition that arbitrary 
ideas (whose specific content is not imposed by either external reality nor, in any direct and single-valued 
way, by human cognitive bias) affect market behavior.2  
                                            
1 In overconfidence models, probability errors derive from investors overestimating the precision of an information signal (Kyle 
and Wang 1997; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 1998; Odean 1998). In cumulative prospect theory, individuals 
overestimate the probabilities of rare events (Barberis and Huang 2008). In models of limited attention, individuals neglect some 
information signal (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Peng and Xiong 2006). 
2 An exception is the examination of investor beliefs through surveys. Shiller, Kon-Ya and Tsutsui (1996) and Shiller (2000) 
discuss evidence from surveys of investors about the role popular models about markets during bubble periods. For example, there 
is no general psychological bias which directly forces people at all times to believe that in the long run California real estate can’t go 
down, but the adoption of this once-popular belief presumably affected how individuals invest. Graham and Harvey (2001) find that 
many CFOs report using firm risk rather than project risk in evaluating new investments, and that many CFOs at small firms report 
using the payback criterion as a capital budgeting technique. These reports presumably reflect a mistaken belief about the validity 
of these procedures. Some theories of security pricing are also based on incorrect adoption by investors of world-views. In Hong, 
Stein and Yu (2007), investors believe in oversimplified linear models. In Rabin and Vayanos (2010), individuals believe that after 
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In this paper, we test whether market participants use a mistaken model of how investment 
outcomes are generated by focusing on a particular type of mistaken theory, numerological superstitions. 
We document that firms in China going public have a frequency of lucky listing codes that is greater than 
would be expected by chance, that there is an initial valuation premium associated with lucky listing codes, 
and that lucky listing codes are associated with lower post-IPO abnormal stock returns. 
Superstition is important in its own right, and also provides a valuable testing ground for the idea 
that mistaken ideas matter in capital markets. Superstitions are arbitrary; their content is not directly 
implied by general cognitive biases. Where one culture views 8 as lucky, or 13 as unlucky, another does not. 
A general psychological predisposition to being superstitious does not force individuals or societies to 
adopt the notion that 13 is unlucky, as contrasted with the opposite belief.  
Some heuristics and biases are culture dependent; for example, the tendency to expect reversal of 
past good or bad outcomes has been found to be stronger in Asian culture. However, heuristics are also not 
completely arbitrary; they are supposed to be adaptive within their ranges of validity (Gigerenzer, Todd and 
ABC Research Group 1999). In contrast, a superstitious fear or love of numbers is nonfunctional and can be 
harmful. As such, tests of the effect of superstition are revealing in showing that people are subject to biases 
based on the adoption of completely nonfunctional cultural traits. 
Furthermore, superstition is an important part of how people make sense of randomness and form 
strategies for dealing with risk. Throughout history, people have believed that certain rituals, objects, or 
symbols can be used to influence their luck. For example, Chinese emperors regularly held costly and 
time-consuming ceremonies to pray for rain. Ancient cultures relied on omens to divine the wills of the 
Gods.3 Even in modern times, many people believe in luck and take steps to improve it. Examples include 
professional athletes and stock traders wearing lucky articles of clothing, keeping lucky objects, or 
following luck-inducing rituals (Melamed and Tamarkin 1996; Collin 2003; Burger and Lynn 2005).  
                                                                                                                                             
a run of successes in independent drawings, a failure becomes more likely. These theories have been used to derive and in some 
cases test implications about return moments such as autocorrelations and skewness. Our focus on numerological superstition 
allows us to test for implications that are unique to the superstition hypothesis, such as the effects of lucky numbers on decisions.     
3 In ancient Rome, important political decisions, such as the appointment and inauguration of any magistrate and the advancement 
of any military campaign, required a positive result from taking the auspices. Fortuna, the Goddess of Luck, was worshipped across 
the Roman Empire.   
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There is anecdotal evidence that superstition affects financial decisions.4 However, there has been 
little systematic empirical work on superstition in finance, perhaps because the testing of some Western 
superstitious ideas (e.g., unluckiness of Friday the 13th) imposes a small sample size. In this and other 
respects, numerological superstition in China’s stock market provides an appealing venue for testing how 
superstitious beliefs affect firm behavior and/or market valuations.  
Psychological research indicates that beliefs about lucky numbers affect individuals’ optimism in 
everyday life (Darke and Freedman 1997). In cognitive priming experiments, Asian individuals who were 
exposed to lucky numbers gave higher estimates of their chances of winning a lottery, expressed greater 
willingness to participate in a lottery, and expressed greater willingness to make risky financial investments 
(Jiang, Cho and Adaval 2009).  
Lucky and unlucky numbers are ubiquitous in Chinese culture. In Chinese numerology, the 
numbers 6, 8, and 9 are lucky because they sound similar to words that have positive meanings such as 
‘prosper’ and ‘longevity’, while 4 is unlucky because in Chinese it sounds similar to the word ‘death’. For 
this reason, consumer product advertisements in China disproportionately include 8 and exclude 4 
(Simmons and Schindler 2003), and Taiwanese consumers are willing to pay more for a package of 8 tennis 
balls than 10 (Block and Kramer 2009). Anecdotal evidence abounds that numerological beliefs influence 
behavior in China. For example, the opening ceremony of the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympic Games 
officially started at 8:08 p.m. on August 8, 2008, because 8 is a lucky number.5 
In particular, anecdotal evidence suggests that lucky numbers play a role in investors’ decisions in 
China. One news story (Wall Street Journal Asia, 5/24/07) quotes a Mr. Yan, a Chinese investor, as saying 
“I believe good codes will bring good luck.” Mr. Yan attributed the good performance of his stock to the 
                                            
4 According to one depression-era report, “One morning, FDR told his group he was thinking of raising the gold price by 21 cents. 
Why that figure, his entourage asked. 'It's a lucky number,' Roosevelt said, 'because it's three times seven.' As Henry Morgenthau 
later wrote, `If anybody knew how we really set the gold price through a combination of lucky numbers, etc., I think they would be 
frightened,’” (Shlaes 2007). One vendor of an astrology-based commodity trading system advertised that it would “put the power of 
the universe behind your trades.” Robert Citron, Orange County Treasurer, consulted astrological charts in making investment 
decisions, asserting that “They were very accurate” (San Jose Mercury News, 7/25/98). Citron’s trading created enormous losses 
for Orange County. The popularity of technical trading systems may come in part from superstitious faith in theories about the 
power of numerical patterns. 
5 Many more examples can be found in Yardley (2006), Areddy (2007) and an article translated from the May 20, 2006 issue of 
China Daily, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/20/content_4576062.htm. 
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two 8s in its numerical code (600881).  
As this example illustrates, Chinese stock exchanges designate stocks with numerical codes and 
investors typically refer to those stocks by the codes. For example, The Bank of China’s listing code on the 
Shanghai Exchange is 601988, which contains lucky numbers 6, 8, and 9. We investigate whether Chinese 
investors resort to this superstitious belief in choosing stocks and thus exhibit preferences for stocks with 
lucky numbers in their numerical codes.  
The market for IPOs is a natural domain for testing for the effects of managerial or investor 
superstition, because high uncertainty about long-run fundamentals maximizes the space for superstition to 
play a role, and because individual investors (whom we would expect to be especially prone to superstition) 
participate heavily in IPOs.6  
In general, tests of whether managers prefer some stock characteristic, or cater to an investor 
preference for it, need to distinguish these possibilities from the alternative hypothesis that there is a 
rational reason why the given characteristic (such as dividends) is rationally valued by investors. However, 
it is hard to think of a direct rational reason for firms or investors to prefer lucky listing codes (apart from 
the indirect benefit to firms of catering to investor irrationality).  
Our tests are based on a sample of newly listed firms in China from 1991 through 2005.7 If 
investors exhibit preferences for IPO firms with lucky numbers in the listing code, we predict that managers 
will try to obtain lucky numbers in their listing codes either because they share, or cater to, investor 
superstition; that the high demand for IPOs with lucky listing codes will be associated with a price premium; 
and that as subsequent performance information arrives, there will be a price reversal to eliminate the lucky 
number premium as information arrives and resolves uncertainty, correcting mispricing (not owing to any 
decrease in the inherent degree of superstition). We therefore predict and test whether (i) IPO firms are 
                                            
6 IPO firms tend to have much more uncertainty than seasoned firms owing to their earlier stage of development. Several studies 
offer findings that support greater riskiness of IPOs and proneness to misvaluation. For example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) show 
that CAPM beta is higher for IPO firms than non-issuers, and Ritter (1991) concludes that imperfect investor rationality affects 
behavior and pricing in the IPO market. Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) suggest that the IPO markets are structured to take 
advantage of individual investor irrationality. There is also theory proposing and evidence confirming that managerial irrationality 
affects the decision to go public (Ljungqvist and Wilhelm 1995; Loughran and Ritter 2002).   
7 We end the sample in 2005 because the Split-share Structure Reform, which has been ongoing since 2005, introduces additional 
error in the measurement of market valuations and abnormal stock returns (as discussed in Subsection 8.2).   
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assigned a higher than expected frequency of lucky listing codes than would be expected to occur randomly; 
(ii) there is an initial high price premium, as measured by Tobin’s q (henceforth q) and by the 
market-to-book ratio, for firms with lucky listing codes; and (iii) the post-IPO stock return performance is 
lower for firms with lucky than with unlucky listing codes.  
Our findings are generally consistent with investors preferring firms with lucky numbers, with the 
managers of IPO firms either sharing this preference, or with managers catering to this preference. We find 
an abnormally high proportion of firms with lucky listing codes and an abnormally low proportion of firms 
with unlucky listing codes. For example, on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the actual proportion of firms 
with lucky (unlucky) listing codes is 22% more (17% less) than expected by chance. Furthermore, the 
actual proportion of firms with at least two consecutive lucky numbers is higher than expected, and that 
with consecutive unlucky numbers is lower than expected. This evidence is consistent with firms 
purposefully attempting to obtain numerical codes with lucky numbers during the IPO process.  
In addition, we examine the association of firm characteristics, such as size, past performance, and 
growth with the likelihood of receiving lucky listing codes. Firm size is the only variable that is significant 
in the logit regression. This is consistent with the notion that large firms have greater bargaining power to 
obtain lucky listing codes from the stock exchanges, and that the total value of having a lucky listing code is 
greater for a larger firm.  
To test whether the high frequency of lucky listing codes is driven by managers being superstitious 
themselves or by managers catering to investors’ superstition, we examine whether firms acquire other 
lucky numbers that are less visible to IPO investors. If managers themselves are superstitious we would 
expect the probability of having a lucky primary telephone/fax number to be higher for firms with lucky 
listing codes than for firms with unlucky listing codes. Contrary to this implication, the probability is 
insignificantly lower for firms with lucky listing codes. This suggests that managerial superstition is not the 
main driver of the acquisition of lucky listing codes.  
With regard to (ii), we find that both q and the equity market-to-book ratio are higher for newly 
listed firms with lucky numbers than for those with unlucky numbers, after controlling for known 
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determinants of firms’ valuation ratios. Specifically, q is 23% higher for firms with lucky listing codes than 
for firms with unlucky listing codes, a difference that is both statistically and economically significant.  
Moreover, with regard to (iii), three-year post-IPO abnormal returns are significantly lower for 
firms with lucky listing codes than for firms with unlucky listing codes, with relative underperformance of 
about 6% per year after appropriate controls. This is consistent with corrective information arriving and 
eliminating the premium associated with lucky numbers. This may be a correction of mispricing caused by 
lucky numbers, or (under a less plausible interpretation) of preexisting mispricing that is correlated with a 
firm being assigned a lucky listing code. Either way, it is consistent with superstitious behavior on the part 
of economic decision makers. In sum, this evidence suggests that: (a) superstition affects stock prices, (b) 
firms either share or cater to investor superstition, and (c) the overvaluation associated with lucky numbers 
tends to be reduced over time as uncertainty about an IPO firm resolves. 
There are alternative possible pathways of causality that imply predictions (ii) and (iii) based on the 
possibility that the firms’ assignment of lucky numbers be correlated with misvaluation at the time of 
issuance. As discussed in the main body of the paper, such a possibility would still require that 
numerological superstition play a role in the IPO market. Furthermore, this possibility is not very plausible, 
as listing codes can be assigned months before issuance.  
Nevertheless, to further test whether managers are more likely to obtain lucky listing codes for 
overvalued firms, we examine whether obtaining a lucky listing codes is correlated with the prior level of 
accruals. Past literature suggests that high accruals prior to the IPO are associated with greater 
overvaluation (e.g., Teoh, Wong and Rao 1998). Inconsistent with the argument that overvalued firms 
acquire lucky numbers, we find that accruals are not significantly related to the probability of firms having 
lucky listing codes (with a negative point estimate for the relationship). 
Overall, the most plausible explanation for our findings is that firms obtain lucky listing codes to 
cater to investor superstition, and that lucky listing codes cause overvaluation and subsequent return 
underperformance. Furthermore, the alternative pathways of causality discussed above are also based upon 
superstition affecting investors’ and/or managers’ behaviors.  
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There has heretofore been little evidence about how the adoption of arbitrary ideas affects market 
prices. Previous work has provided evidence suggesting that investors’ emotions affect stock prices 
(Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003; Edmans, Garcia and Norli 2007; Goetzmann et al. 2014), but emotion is 
not necessarily tied to mistaken ideas. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008) show that trust, a cultural trait, 
affects stock market participation while Li et al. (2013) find that individualism, uncertainty avoidance and 
harmony are significantly associated with corporate risk-taking. While our paper is generally consistent 
with the idea that culture matters in financial market, our focus is on numerological superstition, a different 
cultural trait based on a specific kind of mistaken belief.  
There are several studies on superstition in capital markets. Some focus on Friday the 13th, a day 
that is viewed by many as unlucky. Kolb and Rodriguez (1987) report that CRSP market returns are lower 
on Friday the Thirteenth than on other Fridays, but subsequent literature has not confirmed this.8 Lepori 
(2009) reports that another low-frequency event that might be interpreted as unlucky, the occurrence of 
eclipses, is associated with below-average stock returns. In contrast, we consider a sample where good- and 
bad-luck data are quite frequent. In a recent paper, Agarwal et al. (2014) find that, in Singapore, a country 
heavily influenced by Chinese culture, lucky-numbered housing units and floors enjoy a price premium. 
The focus of Agarwal et al. (2014) is the housing market, while ours is the stock market.    
Our study also provides new evidence of exploitation of investors by firms. A literature on IPO 
markets identifies apparent effects of imperfect investor rationality. In the U.S. and many other countries, 
IPO firms underperform the market in the long run (Ritter 1991; Loughran and Ritter 1995; Henderson, 
Jegadeesh and Weisbach 2006). Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) provide evidence that firms manage 
earnings upwards prior to IPO and that post-IPO stock returns are affected by pre-IPO earnings 
management. Our study differs in providing a link between superstitious beliefs either by investors and/or 
managers to post-IPO abnormal performance. 
 
                                            
8 Later work reports that the effect vanishes after controlling for the turn of the month effect and does not hold in other countries 
(Agrawal and Tandon 1994; Chamberlain and Cheung 1991; Dyl and Maberly 1988).  
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2. Superstition and the Institutional Setting  
 
Magical thinking is reasoning in a way that violates scientific notions of causality. For example, in 
many cultures luck is viewed as a personal essence that can be acquired or protected by means of prayer or 
rituals. One kind of magical thinking is treating symbols or arbitrary associations as having direct causal 
effects on the material world.  
Psychological studies have shown that it is easy to induce magical thinking about everyday matters 
in the laboratory (Pronin et al. 2006). Nor is superstitious belief limited to the scientific illiterate; indeed, 
there is no clear relation between education level and paranormal thinking (De Robertis and Delaney 1993; 
Goode 2002; Mowen and Carlson 2003; Farha and Steward 2006).  
 
2.1 Numerology in China 
 
According to Shu Zhao (as quoted in Yardley 2006), faith in numerological symbolism in China 
can be traced to Confucius and to Taoism. Chinese numerology reflects at least two deviations from 
scientific notions of causality. The first is that the similarity in pronunciation of a number to a word has 
causal import. The second is that having a personal association with a relevant number (and hence 
indirectly with its associated word) will affect the likelihood that an individual will experience favorable 
life events.  
For example, one news story reports that “Tens of thousands of Chinese rushed to get married on 
Wednesday, hoping that the 09/09/09 date would bring longevity to their weddings and lives. Besides 
meaning ‘nine, nine’, ‘jiu, jiu’ in Chinese also means ‘for a long time,’ making Wednesday an auspicious 
day to get married.”9 
Anecdotally, the Chinese fascination with numbers affects many decisions. The Chinese 
government auctions license plate numbers for surprisingly high prices (Yardley 2006). One businessman, 
                                            
9 See news reports at http://en.ce.cn/Life/society/200909/09/t20090909_19974517.shtml and 
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/lifestylenews/view/1003837/1/html. 
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Mr. Ding, paid 54,000 yuan for plate APY888. “For nearly the same money, which is the equivalent of 
$6,750, Ding could have afforded two of the Chinese- made roadsters popular in the domestic car market. 
His bid was almost 20 times what a Chinese farmer earns in a year, and almost seven times the country's per 
capita annual income.” A different license number auction had a high price for AW6666 of 272,000 yuan 
(US$34,000).10 
 
2.2 The Institutional Setting 
 
 Shares of a Chinese listed company can be classified as tradable shares, state shares and legal 
person shares. Tradable shares are tradable on the stock exchanges. State shares are held by the government 
through a designated government agency, while legal person shares are held by separate legal entities, such 
as other state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Neither state shares nor legal person shares were tradable on stock 
exchanges until April 2005, when the China Securities Regulatory Commission announced a Split-Share 
Structure Reform that aimed to make all non-tradable shares publicly tradable, which remained an ongoing 
process as of November 2013 (Liao, Liu and Wang 2014).  
Shares that are tradable on the two stock exchanges in China (the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange) can be classified as either A-shares or B-shares. A-shares can be traded only by 
Chinese citizens and are quoted in RMB (China’s local currency). B-shares were introduced in early 1992, 
exclusively for foreign investors. Unlike A-shares, B-shares are quoted in foreign currencies, and domestic 
investors were not initially permitted to trade B shares. This restriction was later lifted in March 2001. 
Although A- and B-shares have the same shareholder rights, B-shares are traded at a discount relative to 
A-shares. Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2008) provide evidence that information asymmetry measures 
explain the cross-sectional variation in B-share discounts.   
In China the government plays a pivotal role in the IPO process. All IPOs are subject to the 
approval of Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). After approval from the CSRC, firms 
                                            
10 See news reports at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/20/content_4576062.htm. 
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typically obtain listing codes from stock exchanges within one or two days. We thoroughly checked all 
rules on IPOs and were unable to identify any formal rule for the determination of listing codes. Given that 
there is no official rule and the assignment of listing code is not a simple upward count in order of approval, 
there is potentially room for activity on the part of the listing firms’ management or the underwriter to 
influence the choice of code. 
IPO firms usually obtain their listing codes prior to conducting road shows. The listing codes are 
included in the offering documents, and investors typically refer to the stock by their listing codes.11 For 
example, ICBC (Industrial Commerce Bank of China) obtained its listing code (601398) before its road 
shows, when the bank went public in 2006.  
We attempt to infer the time lag between the determination of the listing code and the official 
listing of the IPO shares from the existing literature. Guo and Brooks (2009) show that for most of our 
sample period (i.e., between 1994 and 2000), the average time lag between the approval from CSRC and 
official listing of the shares is 35 days. In the ICBC IPO example, the time lag was more than two months. 
Because it takes only one or two days for firms to obtain the listing code after CSRC approval, this indicates 
that the listing code is typically determined more than one month before the official trading in general. 
In sum, IPO firms in our sample conduct road shows after they obtain the listing code. Normally, 
the time between the determination of the listing code and the official listing of shares is more than one 
month. This institutional feature makes it less plausible that the firms that are expected to be hot issues are 
more likely to be assigned lucky listing codes, since the market sentiment towards the particular stock is 
probably not yet known at the time of assigning listing codes. 
 
3. Sample formation, Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics 
 
                                            
11 See the description at: 
http://www.icbc.com.cn/ICBC/%E7%BD%91%E4%B8%8A%E7%90%86%E8%B4%A2/%E7%90%86%E8%B4%A2%E4%B9
%A6%E5%90%A7/%E8%A1%8C%E5%AE%B6/06%E5%86%AC%E5%AD%A3%E5%8F%B7/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%B
D%E5%B7%A5%E5%95%86%E9%93%B6%E8%A1%8C%E8%82%A1%E6%94%B9%E4%B8%8A%E5%B8%82%E5%A4
%A7%E4%BA%8B%E8%AE%B0.htm; http://stock.sohu.com/20101129/n277986319.shtml; 
http://static.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/scfw/gg/ssgs/2012-05-22/601339_20120522_1.pdf. 
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3.1  Sample Formation  
The initial sample consists of all firms that issued A shares on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen stock 
exchange and are covered by the China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) Databases 
(2005 version) between 1990 and 2005.12  We end the sample in 2005 because the Split-share Structure 
Reform, an ongoing process since 2005, introduces additional error in the measurement of market 
valuations and abnormal stock returns (as discussed in Subsection 8.2).  The information on shareholding, 
financial performance and stock return is directly downloaded from the databases. After deleting firms with 
missing information on the IPO date, our final sample includes 1,384 listed firms, 832 of which are listed on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and 552 of which are listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
 
3.2  Variable Definitions 
We identify firms with lucky numbers by examining each digit of the listing code. Firms with at 
least one lucky number (6, 8 and 9) and no unlucky number (4) in the listing code are defined as firms with 
lucky listing codes, while firms with at least one unlucky number and no lucky numbers are defined as firms 
with unlucky listing codes. It is hard to gauge the perceived luckiness of the remaining firms’ codes, given 
the co-occurrence of both lucky and unlucky numbers (or the absence of both).13 All Shanghai-listed firms 
have numerical codes beginning with 6, and this digit is ignored in our classifications.  
To investigate whether firms with lucky listing codes are initially priced at a premium, we use q and 
the equity market-to-book ratio to measure firms’ valuations. Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio of the market 
value of a firm to the replacement cost of its assets. We estimate the replacement cost by using the book 
value of total assets.  
                                            
12 We find results that are similar to those reported here when B-shares are included. 
13 It is not clear how to interpret a mix of lucky and unlucky numbers, so we term such a mix “neutral”. In particular cases, such 
numbers may in fact be viewed as either lucky or unlucky. For example, the number ‘9413’ contains both the lucky digit ‘9’ and the 
unlucky digit ‘4’. But the Chinese pronunciation of this number is rather ominous, as it sounds like the phrase ‘90% chance of death 
and 10% chance of survival’. On November 25, 2012, the Apple Daily, an influential newspaper in Hong Kong, reported that a 
license plate containing 9413 did not receive a single bidding attempt in an open auction before the government took it back (the 
article is available at http://s.nextmedia.com/apple/a.php?i=20121125&sec_id=4104&a=18079273). This example illustrates that 
there is no easy way to determine the luckiness/unluckiness of listing codes that contain a mix of lucky and unlucky digits, so we 
remove such cases from the sample. 
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We use two measures of q. (As a robustness check, we discuss the test results using other measures 
in Subsection 8.4.)  TQ0 is the firm’s price per share multiplied by the total number of shares, plus its book 
value of long-term debt, inventory, and current liabilities, minus its book value of current assets; divided by 
its book value of total assets. TQ0 assumes that the market price of non-tradable shares is the same as that of 
tradable shares. 
Our second proxy for q, TQ80, is calculated by applying an 80% discount to the market price of the 
firm’s tradable shares to estimate the market value of non-tradable shares. The reason for the discount is 
that during our sample period, a substantial proportion of shares of listed firms in China were in the form of 
state shares and legal person shares, which could not be traded freely and therefore did not have market 
prices. To address this issue, we apply the finding of Chen and Xiong (2001) that non-tradable state-owned 
shares and legal person shares in China are traded on informal markets at a discount of between 70% and 
80%. 
In addition, we use the equity market-to-book ratio as an alternative valuation measure. MB is 
computed as the firm's price per share multiplied by the total number of shares at the end of the month 
divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of the year.  
We obtain measures of firms’ size, performance, leverage, growth and the relative magnitude of 
firms’ tangible assets, which previous literature has shown help explain valuation multiples (for example, 
La Porta et al. 2002; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988). Size is proxied by the natural logarithm of total 
sales. 14 FWe have two measures for firms’ operating performance. One is operating profit margin 
(OpProfitMargin), computed as profits from operations divided by sales; and the other is cash return on 
assets (Cash ROA), computed as operating cash flows scaled by total assets. We use a cash-based operating 
performance measure because previous literature provides evidence that IPO firms tend to manage earnings 
upward (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998; Aharony, Lee and Wong 2000), which makes accrual-based 
accounting earnings noisy measures of actual operating performance for IPO firms. Leverage (Lev) is 
                                            
14 We do not use market value as the proxy for size because the market value of non-tradable shares is difficult to estimate. Our use 
of sales as a proxy for size is consistent with many academic studies on China (for example, Ding, Zhang and Zhang 2007) and 
other emerging markets (e.g., Friedman, Johnson and Mitton 2003). 
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computed as total debt (short term plus long term liabilities due within one year plus long-term debt) 
divided by total assets. Growth is defined as growth in sales in the current year. The relative magnitude of 
the firm’s tangible assets (Tangibility) is defined as the book value of the firm’s tangible assets (total assets 
minus intangible assets) divided by its total sales.  
 
3.3  Descriptive Statistics 
3.3.1  Distribution of listing codes 
We report the distribution of listing codes for our sample firms across the two exchanges in Table 1. 
Specifically, for each year, Table 1 gives the mean, median, minimum and maximum value of the numerical 
codes assigned to firms that were listed in that year separately for the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
Several points emerge. First, the two major stock exchanges differ in the format of the numerical 
code. Each stock listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange has a code beginning with 6, and each listed on the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange has a code starting with zero.  
Second, although the numerical codes have six digits on both exchanges, variations in the 
numerical codes exist only in the last three digits for stocks listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and in 
the last four digits for stocks listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, for the sample period we examine.  In 
defining lucky and unlucky listing codes, we only consider the relevant digits of the code that vary in the 
sample. Thus, the initial 6 in codes on the Shanghai Stock Exchange is not used in defining lucky codes. 
Third, the number of IPOs varies across years. For the Shanghai Stock Exchange, the number of 
IPOs ranges from 0 in 1991 to 103 in 1996, while for the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the number of IPOs 
ranges from 0 in 2003 to 121 in 1997.  
Fourth, the assignment of numerical codes is far from sequential. As we can see from both the mean 
and median values, there is no apparent increasing time-series trend in numerical codes for either exchange. 
This non-sequential nature of the assignment of the listing codes provides an opening for managerial efforts 
to obtain lucky numbers.  
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[Table 1 here] 
 
3.3.2 Time-series trends in q 
To investigate whether firms with lucky numbers are priced at a premium, we first visually inspect 
the time-series trend of q. Figure 1 depicts the mean value of TQ80 for firms with lucky listing codes and 
those with unlucky listing codes. Since the calculation of TQ80 requires information from financial 
statements, such as book value of long-term debt and inventory, which are not immediately available at IPO, 
we start from the 12th month after IPO, with a sufficient time lag to allow such information to be disclosed 
to investors.  
As is evident from the graph, firms with lucky listing codes enjoy a premium over firms with 
unlucky listing codes, and this premium lasts until the 36th month after IPO. This finding is consistent with 
investors paying a premium for firms with lucky listing codes initially, and that this premium gradually 
dissipates over the three years after IPO. Alternatively, it is also consistent with managers of overvalued 
firms selecting lucky numbers (perhaps to cater to investor sentiment), and that this overvaluation results in 
high q and low subsequent abnormal returns. The disappearance of the lucky-number premium about three 
years after IPO is consistent with U.S. studies on post-IPO abnormal returns (Ritter 1991).  
 [Figure 1 here] 
 
3.3.3 Summary statistics  
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for valuation measures and firms’ fundamentals, such as 
profitability and growth, for firms with lucky and unlucky listing codes within three years after IPO. We 
have two objectives. First, we investigate whether, as suggested by Figure 1, the lucky-number premium 
exists for the valuation measures we consider. Second, we investigate whether there are differences in firms’ 
fundamentals between firms with lucky listing codes and firms with unlucky listing codes that might 
explain the lucky-number premium.  
We find significant differences in valuation multiples between firms with lucky versus unlucky 
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listing codes. For both measures of q, and for the market-to-book ratio, newly listed firms with lucky listing 
codes trade at a premium relative to those with unlucky listing codes. Specifically, TQ80, a relatively 
precise measure of q, averages 1.142 for firms with lucky listing codes and 0.928 for firms with unlucky 
listing codes, which indicates a 23% pricing premium for firms with lucky listing codes. This lucky-number 
premium is both statistically significant and economically substantial.  
In contrast, there are no significant differences between the two groups of firms in operating profit 
margin (OpProfitMargin), cash return on assets (Cash ROA), leverage (Lev), growth (Growth) or the 
relative magnitude of tangible assets (Tangibility). However, firms with lucky codes are significantly larger 
in Size than those with unlucky codes. The differences in both the mean and the median are significant at the 
10% level. This is consistent with large firms having greater bargaining power to obtain lucky listing codes 
from the stock exchanges, or greater benefit from having lucky codes. 
[Table 2 here] 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 generally corroborate the findings in Figure 1, and suggest a 
premium for newly listed firms with lucky listing codes. This premium seems unjustified by fundamentals, 
as there is no difference in profitability, leverage or growth between firms with lucky numbers and firms 
with unlucky numbers. This suggests either that lucky numbers cause overvaluation, or that overvalued 
firms are more likely to obtain lucky numbers (perhaps in order to cater to investor perceptions).  
We next examine the proportion of firms with lucky/unlucky numbers to see whether managers of 
the listing firms deliberately attempt to obtain lucky numbers and avoid unlucky numbers in the listing 
code.  
 
4. Managers Sharing of or Catering to Investor Superstition 
 
  If managers are themselves superstitious, they may prefer lucky listing codes. Furthermore, there is 
evidence that managers cater to imperfectly rational investor perceptions (Baker and Wurgler 2004). If 
investors are willing to pay more for IPOs with lucky listing codes relative to IPOs with unlucky codes, 
16 
 
listing firms should respond accordingly by lobbying the exchanges for lucky listing codes. We therefore 
test whether the proportion of firms with lucky listing codes is higher, and the proportion of firms with 
unlucky listing codes is lower, than would be the case under random assignment.  
 
4.1  Frequency of Lucky Numbers 
Table 3 reports the actual and expected proportions separately for firms with lucky listing codes, 
firms with unlucky listing codes and other firms. As a reminder, although the numerical codes have six 
digits on both exchanges, variations in the numerical codes exist only in the last three digits for stocks listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and in the last four digits for stocks listed on the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, for the sample period we examine. In all our empirical tests we consider only these relevant 
digits in the classifications.  
Since the number of digits that vary across firms differs across the two exchanges, the expected 
distribution for the lucky/unlucky listing codes is different. Consequently, we report our results separately 
for the two exchanges. The expected proportions are computed assuming a random assignment of 
three-digit listing codes for firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and a random assignment of 
four-digit listing codes for those on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. If each relevant digit in the code is 
determined randomly, it has an equal probability of being any of the digits from 0 to 9.15  
For example, to compute the expected proportion for a three-digit listing code, we first compute the 
expected proportion for lucky listing codes where one digit takes on a lucky number and the other two digits 
take on neutral numbers (numbers that are not deemed as either “lucky” or “unlucky”). Basic probability 
theory shows that the expected proportion is 28.8%. We then compute the expected proportion for lucky 
                                            
15 In many real world data sources, the distribution of digits is not uniform. This is codified in Benford’s law, which predicts that the 
first digit of a number will be 1 almost one third of the time (see, e.g., http://mathworld.wolfram.com/BenfordsLaw.html). However, 
Benford’s law does not apply to listing codes. For example, one listed firm in the Shanghai stock exchange, Shanghai Port 
Container Co., Ltd, has a listing code of 600018. The relevant portion of the listing code, 018, starts with a zero, which by 
assumption is precluded in Benford’s Law. More generally, since listing codes are arbitrary, a uniform distribution of digits seems 
a more appropriate benchmark. Listing codes also do not satisfy other conditions for Benford’s law, which applies for variables 
whose logarithms are distributed uniformly and are distributed across several orders of magnitude. Empirically the listing code 
frequencies do not obey Benford’s law. For example, the frequency of a first digit of 1 is close to 10%, whereas Benford’s law 
predicts a frequency of approximately 1/3.  
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listing codes containing two or three lucky digits. The sum of these expected proportions is the expected 
proportion of three-digit listing codes that contain at least one lucky number and no unlucky number.  
Table 3 indicates that among stocks listed on the Shanghai stock exchange, the actual proportion of 
firms with lucky listing codes is 55.2%, which is 7.4% higher in percentage terms, than 51.4%, the 
proportion expected by chances. The proportion of firms with unlucky listing codes is 6.7%, which is 47.2% 
lower in percentage terms, than the expected proportion of 12.7%. For the Shenzhen stock exchange, the 
proportion of firms with lucky listing codes (64.3%) is higher than the expected proportion (52.7%) by 22.0% 
in percentage terms; the proportion of firms with unlucky listing codes (9.2%) is lower than the expected 
proportion (11.1%) by 17.1% in percentage terms. The differences between actual and expected 
proportions of lucky and unlucky numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level, except for the 
proportion of unlucky numbers among Shenzhen-listed firms. Overall, these findings support the prediction 
that lucky listing codes are abnormally prevalent while unlucky listed codes are abnormally rare.  
[Table 3 here] 
 
4.2  Sequences of Lucky Digits and End-Lucky Numbers 
In Chinese culture, there is a popular belief that a sequence of lucky numbers is luckier than a single 
lucky number. For example, the listing code of Mr. Yan discussed in the introduction, 600881, was 
especially pleasing to him as it contained two 8s in immediate succession. We test whether such beliefs 
affect the frequency of listing codes. Specifically, we report the actual and expected proportions of firms 
with at least two consecutive lucky/unlucky numbers in Table 4. We predict that the proportion of firms 
with at least two consecutive lucky numbers is higher than expected while the proportion of firms with at 
least two consecutive unlucky numbers is lower than expected. 
Table 4 Panel A shows that the proportion of firms with at least two consecutive lucky numbers is 
15.6% on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, which is significantly higher than the expected proportion of 
13.5%, while it is 18.1%, higher than expected (17.0%), on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. When we turn to 
the proportion of firms with at least two consecutive unlucky numbers, we find the opposite results. The 
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actual proportion on the Shanghai Stock Exchange is 0.2%, less than one sixth of the expected proportion of 
1.3% while it is 0.4% on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, less than one third of the expected proportion of 
1.3%, with both differences between the actual and expected proportions being significant at the 5% level. 
Overall, these results support the hypothesis that investors’ preference for a sequence of lucky numbers and 
distaste for a sequence of unlucky numbers are reflected by firms’ listing codes. 
A further test for superstition effects is motivated by the idea that the last digit in the listing code is 
especially salient. In general, we might expect either the first or last digit to be more salient than 
intermediate digits. However, on the Shanghai Stock Exchange the first digit in the listing code is 
automatically 6 and on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange the first digit is automatically zero.  We therefore 
focus on testing whether the proportion of firms with a lucky (unlucky) number in the last digit of the listing 
code is higher (lower) than expected. Our results are reported in Table 4 Panel B.  
Panel B shows that among Shanghai-listed stocks, the proportion of firms with listing codes ending 
in a lucky number is 26.4%, which is higher than the expected proportion, of 24.3%; the proportion of firms 
with listing codes ending in an unlucky number is 1.8%, substantially lower than the expected proportion of 
4.9%, and the difference is significant at the 1% level. Results are similar when we turn to Shenzhen-listed 
stocks. The proportion of firms with listing codes ending in a lucky number is 30.4%, which is significantly 
higher than the expected proportion of 21.9%. Furthermore, the proportion of firms with listing codes 
ending in an unlucky number is 2.9%, which is lower than the expected proportion of 3.4%. Overall, results 
in Panel B are consistent with investors’ preference for lucky numbers in the last digit of the listing code. 
[Table 4 here] 
Together, the evidence from the Table 3 and 4 suggests a deliberate attempt by managers or the 
stock exchange to include lucky rather than unlucky numbers in the listing code.  
 
4.3  Managerial Superstition or Catering to Investors’ Superstition? 
The abnormally high frequency of lucky listing codes is consistent with two possible explanations. 
The first is that managers are superstitious themselves, incorrectly believing that lucky listing codes bring 
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good fortune. The second is that managers cater to investors’ preference for lucky numbers.  
 If this finding is driven by managerial superstition, then managers of firms with lucky listing codes 
will be more superstitious, and thus will be more likely than managers of firms with unlucky listing codes to 
obtain lucky telephone/fax numbers. To test this prediction, we obtain firms’ telephone/fax numbers in the 
IPO year from the ORIANA database. There are 498 firms with lucky listing codes and 59 firms with 
unlucky listing codes that have non-missing telephone/fax numbers. We examine the last four digits of 
these numbers, because firms have more flexibility in choosing these digits. The firm is deemed as having a 
lucky telephone number/fax number if the last four digits of the firm’s telephone number/fax number 
contain one or more of the lucky numbers 6, 8 and 9, but not the unlucky number 4. We report the likelihood 
of having lucky telephone/fax numbers separately for firms with lucky listing codes and firms with unlucky 
listing codes in Panel C of Table 4. 
 Panel C reports that, contrary to our prediction, the probability of having a lucky telephone number 
is lower for firms with lucky listing codes than for firms with unlucky listing codes (0.761 versus 0.814), 
although the difference is not statistically significant. A similar finding emerges when we examine the 
likelihood of having a lucky fax number (0.741 versus 0.814).   
 In sum, Panel C of Table 4 suggests that the abnormally high frequency of lucky listing codes is not 
mainly driven by managers subscribing to the numerology belief themselves. This leaves managerial 
catering to investors’ superstition as the more plausible explanation.  
 
5. Which Firms Get Lucky Listing Codes? 
 
In this section we examine what determines the likelihood of a firm receiving a lucky listing code 
by running a logit regression with the sample of firms with lucky listing codes and those with unlucky 
listing codes. The dependent variable, Lucky, is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm’s listing code 
contains one or more of the lucky digits 6, 8 or 9, but not the unlucky digit 4, and 0 otherwise.  
The independent variables include various firm characteristics: the magnitude of tangible assets 
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(Tangibility), operating profit margin (OpProfitMargin), leverage (Lev), growth (Growth) and size (Size). 
In addition, we examine whether the probability of having a lucky listing code is affected by ownership 
concentration and state ownership. Greater concentration of ownership could increase the incentive for the 
controlling shareholders to use their own contact networks to obtain lucky listing codes for the IPO firm. 
Ownership concentration is measured by Top1, which is the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder. Firms controlled by a state-owned enterprises or state-owned asset management agent may, 
through political influence, be more likely to get a lucky listing code. We measure state ownership through 
Top1_state, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s largest direct shareholder is a state-owned asset 
management bureau/company, and zero otherwise. Firms may also manipulate earnings to increase their 
bargaining power in obtaining lucky listing codes. We therefore control for total accruals (TAccrual), 
computed as net income minus cash flow from operations (both scaled by total assets), in the fiscal year 
when the firm goes public. 
The regression results are reported in Table 5. Model 1 does not include industry dummies while 
Model 2 does. In both regressions, the only independent variable that is significant in the regression is Size 
which indicates that larger firms are more likely to get lucky listing codes. Following the results in model 1, 
when Size increases from its 5th percentile to the 95th percentile and all other independent variables are kept 
at their median values, the probability of having an unlucky instead of a lucky listing code declines from 13% 
to 6%, i.e., it is roughly cut in half. These findings are consistent with the notion that larger firms have more 
bargaining power and hence are more likely to obtain lucky numbers and avoid unlucky numbers in their 
listing codes. 
[Table 5 here] 
 
6. Are Lucky Firms Valued More Highly than Unlucky Firms at Listing? 
 
 The descriptive statistics in Table 2 provide preliminary evidence that within three years after IPO, 
newly listed firms with lucky listing codes are traded at a premium without justification from fundamentals, 
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such as profitability and growth. However, it is important to control for other possible determinants of q. To 
the extent that there are differences between firms with lucky and unlucky listing codes in other 
fundamental measures such as Size, a multivariate test is necessary to determine whether the premium is 
actually associated with lucky listing codes per se.  
We therefore regress q and the equity market-to-book ratio on leverage (Lev), size (Size), growth 
(Growth), the relative magnitude of tangible assets (Tangibility), and current operating performance 
(proxied by Cash ROA). We use cash return on assets due to the concern that accrual-based earnings are 
managed upwards at IPO (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998). In addition, we include industry dummies to 
control for the industry fixed effects.16 The sample consists of firms with lucky listing codes and firms with 
unlucky listing codes. We run the regression separately for observations within three years after IPO and 
those more than three years after IPO, since our graphical evidence suggests that the lucky-number 
premium seems to disappear three years after IPO.  
The results are reported in Table 6. Our inferences are based on t-statistics with double-clustering 
by calendar month and firm (Petersen 2009).  According to Petersen (2009), such t-statistics are robust with 
respect to cross-sectional and time-series correlations in residuals.  
The first three columns, (1a), (2a) and (3a) under “≤ 3 Years after IPO”, report the results for 
observations within three years after IPO. These results are largely consistent with previous literature. The 
coefficient on leverage (Lev) is reliably negative (except when the market-to-book ratio is the dependent 
variable), while the coefficient on Growth is reliably positive. This finding is consistent with evidence from 
previous research that firms with high leverage tend to be traded at a discount, while firms with high growth 
tend to be valued at a premium (Lang, Ofek and Stulz 1996; La Porta et al. 2002). The coefficient on Size is 
negative, indicating that larger firms are traded at a lower valuation multiple. The coefficient on Tangibility 
is negative, which is consistent with the notion that firms with more intangible assets tend to have higher 
valuations (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988).  
                                            
16 We do not control for year fixed effects, as we investigate the valuation and return performance over a rolling window after each 
IPO, making it unlikely that year fixed effects would influence the findings. In untabulated tests, we show that adding year fixed 
effects does not change our inferences.  
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[Table 6 here] 
We focus on the dummy (Lucky), which is equal to 1 for firms with lucky listing codes, and 0 for 
firms with unlucky listing codes. The coefficient is positive and significant at the 5% level, regardless of 
which valuation measure we examine. This evidence suggests that firms with lucky listing codes are traded 
at a premium within three years after IPO, and this premium cannot be explained by other determinants of 
valuation multiples. The coefficient on TQ80 is equal to 0.178, indicating that on average, q is higher by 
0.178 for firms with lucky listing codes. Compared to the average q of 0.928 for firms with unlucky listing 
codes as reported in Table 2, 0.178 represents a premium of 19.2%. This indicates that the lucky-number 
premium is economically substantial as well as statistically significant.  
If the lucky-number premium results from superstitious beliefs, we expect correction over time as 
uncertainty about the firm’s prospects is resolved and expectations are forced toward more rational levels. 
To investigate whether the superstition premium dissipates in the long run, we examine the premium more 
than three years after IPO. The results are reported in columns (1b), (2b) and (3b) of Table 6, under “> 3 
Years after IPO”. We find that the premium greatly diminishes. Among the three regressions with different 
valuation measures, none yield positive and significant coefficients for the dummy representing firms with 
lucky numbers (Lucky).  
We further investigate whether the lucky-number valuation premium differs significantly between 
the first three years of IPO and the subsequent years. Specifically, a Chi-squared (χ2) test confirms that the 
coefficient on Lucky is different across the two time periods. The difference is highly significant when the 
dependent variable is either TQ80 or MB. It is however insignificant when the dependent variable is TQ0.  
Firms with lucky listing codes may differ from firms with unlucky listing codes, potentially 
creating an endogeneity problem. For example, our q tests would be biased if growth firms or overvalued 
firms were more likely to obtain lucky listing codes. We cannot entirely rule out this explanation. However, 
in the tests of Section 5, only size is a significant predictor of a firm receiving a lucky listing code. So it does 
not seem to be the case that having a lucky listing code is a proxy for growth opportunities.  
Furthermore, the endogeneity explanation (both here, and for the abnormal return tests of Section 7) 
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is based on greater acquisition of lucky listing codes by high-valuation firms. It is not obvious why this 
would occur unless managers share or cater to perceived investor superstition. Thus, the endogeneity 
explanation still implies accepting one of the primary conclusions of this paper, that firm behavior is 
influenced by superstition.  
To summarize, this evidence based on q suggests that superstitious beliefs cause Chinese investors to 
overvalue IPO firms with lucky numbers relative to those with unlucky numbers. By the end of the 3rd year 
after the IPO, as more information about the firm is revealed and uncertainty diminishes, the superstition 
premium dissipates. 
 
7. Do Stocks with Lucky Listing Codes Underperform after Listing? 
 
 The previous section provides evidence that the premium associated with IPOs with lucky listing 
codes dissipates over time, consistent with eventual correction of the numerology-driven mispricing of 
IPOs. Given such reversal, we expect relatively low returns for IPOs with lucky listing codes. We now 
examine this issue explicitly with controls for other return predictors.  
Following previous literature using data from emerging markets (e.g., Chan, Hamao and 
Lakonishok 1991; Loughran and Ritter 1995; Fan, Wong and Zhang 2007; Peng, Wei and Yang 2011), we 
regress monthly market-adjusted returns, avretn_div, on the natural logarithm of the market value (LgMV), 
the natural logarithm of the book-to-market ratio (LgBM) and our test variable, Lucky.  We include LgMV 
and LgBM to control for the size and book-to-market effects (Fama and French 1993; Fama and French 
1997), with the market value for non-tradable shares assumed to be at an 80% discount of that of tradable 
shares.17 The coefficient on Lucky measures the difference in market-adjusted returns between firms with 
lucky listing codes and those with unlucky listing codes, after controlling for other firm characteristics. To 
control for industry effects, we include industry dummies. Our inferences are based on t-statistics with 
double-clustering by calendar month and firm.  
                                            
17 The results are similar if we instead assume that the market value of non-tradable shares is the same as that of tradable shares. 
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The results are reported in Table 7 separately for observations within three years after IPO and 
those more than three years after IPO. Firms with lucky listing codes tend to have lower returns than firms 
with unlucky listing codes for the three years after IPO. This finding is consistent with investors correcting 
the initial lucky-number premium over time. The coefficient on Lucky is −0.005, indicating that on average, 
the monthly return of firms with lucky listing codes is lower by 0.5% per month relative to firms with 
unlucky listing codes. Thus, the cost to a trader of investing superstitiously is about 6% per year, which is 
substantial. 
For observations more than three years after IPO, we find no evidence of different returns between 
those with lucky listing codes and those with unlucky listing codes. This evidence seems to indicate that 
investors correct their initial mispricing of IPOs with lucky listing codes within the first three years after 
IPO.  
An endogeneity problem, either for the tests here or for the valuation ratio tests, would occur if 
firms that acquire lucky listing codes are more likely to be overvalued by the market for reasons unrelated to 
lucky listing numbers per se. This would induce both high valuations and low subsequent abnormal returns.  
We cannot rule out this possibility completely, but since listing codes are selected prior to IPO road 
shows which can occur months later, at the time of listing code acquisition the manager will typically not 
know how under- or overvalued the firm will later be. Furthermore, it is not at all obvious that managers of 
a firm that will be overvalued will be more eager than managers of later-to-be undervalued firms to obtain 
lucky listing codes. A firm that will be undervalued may have a strong incentive to obtain a lucky listing 
code in order to offset the undervaluation.  
Furthermore, the evidence from Section 5 that the level of accruals is not a predictor of the firm 
receiving a lucky listing code fails to support the hypothesis that managers who expect their firms to be 
overvalued are more likely to obtain lucky numbers. Previous literature on U.S. firms finds that high 
accruals are associated with overvaluation both among general firms (Sloan, 1996) and among IPO firms in 
particular (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998). In China, there is evidence of earnings management prior to IPOs, 
and evidence that higher accruals in China IPOs are associated with lower subsequent operating 
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performance (Aharony, Lee and Wong 2000; Chen and Yuan 2004).18 If managers of firms that are 
later-to-be overvalued (for reasons other than superstition) were prone to obtaining lucky codes, we would 
have expected high accruals to be associated with receiving lucky codes. 
 Overall, the most plausible interpretation of our findings is that it is the lucky listing codes 
themselves that are inducing overvaluation and poor post-IPO return performance.  
 [Table 7 here] 
 
8. Robustness Checks 
 
We now verify the robustness of the valuation and return findings of Tables 6 and 7. In the earlier 
analyses, the choice of control variables was mainly motivated by previous findings about return predictors 
using U.S. data. We now add additional controls to take into account the institutional settings peculiar to 
emerging markets, especially China. We also verify robustness with respect to alternative empirical 
specifications and ways of measuring test variables.  
 
8.1  Ownership Concentration, State Ownership and Earnings Management 
We consider three variables that potentially affect inferences: ownership concentration, state 
ownership and earnings management. We first discuss ownership concentration. Previous literature (Bai et 
al. 2004) argues that the relationship between ownership concentration and firm valuation depends upon the 
current level of ownership concentration. If current ownership concentration is low, an increase in 
ownership concentration is likely to increase firm valuation by mitigating the free-rider problem among 
shareholders attempting to monitor the managers (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988). However, if current 
ownership concentration is high, a further increase is likely to lower firm valuation because it reduces 
constraints on tunneling from other shareholders.  
As ownership concentration of firms listed in China is normally high, Bai et al. (2004) predict and 
                                            
18 Table 8 shows that high accruals are associated with higher q; Table 9 reports a negative relation between accruals and post-IPO 
returns after controlling for other predictors, though the association is not statistically significant. 
26 
 
find a negative relation between ownership concentration and q in China. Following Bai et al. (2004), we 
add Top1, a measure of ownership concentration, to our multivariate regressions.Top1 is the percentage of 
shares held by the largest shareholder.19 
We next turn to state ownership. Sun and Tong (2003) find that the state ownership has a negative 
effect on post-IPO performance. We therefore control for state ownership by including Top1_state, a 
dummy that equals 1 if the firm’s largest direct shareholder is a state-owned asset management 
bureau/company and zero otherwise, in the regression.   
Lastly, we control for pre-IPO earnings management, which potentially affects firms’ valuations 
and returns (Teoh, Welch and Wong 1998). Our measure of pre-IPO earnings management is total accruals 
(TAccrual), computed as net income minus cash flow from operating activities, both scaled by total assets, 
in the fiscal year when the firm goes public.20  
Table 8 reports the valuation analysis, and Table 9 reports the post-IPO return analysis that includes 
the three additional control variables. In the valuation analysis, we also control for the operating profit 
margin, following Bai et al. (2004). The first three columns of Table 8 are based on observations within 
three years after IPO.  
[Table 8 here] 
Consistent with previous literature, firm valuations are higher for smaller firms, firms with higher 
sales growth and firms with higher current operating profit margin. Tangibility takes a negative coefficient, 
suggesting that firms with more intangible assets are valued at a higher multiple.  
The coefficient on TAccrual is positive and significant, which indicates that firms that manage 
earnings upwards are valued more highly. This finding is consistent with the findings for U.S. firms of Teoh, 
Welch and Wong (1998).  
More importantly, we find that inclusion of the additional variables does not affect our inferences. 
                                            
19 However, our results could be driven by ownership concentration only if concentration were correlated with the assignment of 
lucky listing codes. That in itself would be consistent with exchanges’ or managers’ belief in lucky numbers. Moreover, the results 
in Table 5 show that ownership concentration is not statistically associated with the likelihood of having lucky numbers. 
20 Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) argue that this is a proxy for earnings management related to IPO because this fiscal year includes 
months prior to IPO, and managers may not want to rewind earnings management immediately after IPO due to concerns over legal 
and reputational challenges. 
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The coefficient on the dummy associated with lucky numbers (Lucky) is positive and statistically 
significant in all regressions. This evidence is consistent with investors paying a premium for newly listed 
firms with lucky listing codes, and this premium is not explained by ownership concentration, state 
ownership, or earnings management.  
Columns (1b), (2b) and (3b) report results based on observations more than three years after IPO. 
Consistent with our earlier findings, we find that firms are valued more highly if they are smaller, have 
higher growth, lower tangibility and higher current operating profit margin. As in Table 6, among the three 
measures of stock valuation, none yield a positive and significant coefficient on Lucky, at the 10% level. 
These findings confirm that the premium associated with lucky listing codes dissipates by the end of the 
third year after IPO.  
Table 9 reports results from the return analysis. The first regression is based on observations within 
three years after IPO. After controlling for the three additional variables, firms with lucky listing codes have 
significantly lower returns than firms with unlucky listing codes. The second regression shows that there is 
no significant difference in stock returns between firms with lucky listing codes and those with unlucky 
listing codes, when we look beyond the first three years after IPO. In sum, our previous conclusions, that the 
lucky-number-premium unwinds within the first three years after IPO, resulting in abnormally low returns 
over this period, are robust to inclusion of the three additional control variables.  
 [Table 9 here] 
Although the Fama-French three-Factor model is popular in studies using U.S. data, its merits in an 
international setting have been debated. Daniel, Titman and Wei (2001) find that an asset pricing model 
based on firm characteristics, such as size and the book-to-market ratio, performs better than the 
Fama-French three-factor model in the Japan setting.  Eom and Park reach a similar conclusion, using data 
from Korea. Perhaps not surprisingly, most studies on emerging economies rely on characteristics-based 
models (e.g., Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok 1991; Fan, Wong and Zhang 2007; Loughran and Ritter 1995; 
Peng, Wei and Yang 2011). 
Nevertheless, as a robustness check we consider the Fama-French model. Following Fama and 
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French (1993), we rank all firms listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges into two groups, small (S) 
and big (B), according to their market value (computed as the stock price as of the end of June multiplied by 
the number of shares outstanding).  We also sort them into three groups, Low (L), Medium (M) and High 
(H), according to the book-to-market ratio (BM). BM is computed as the book value of equity for the fiscal 
year divided by the market equity at the end of the fiscal year, which is December 31 for Chinese listed 
firms. The Low and High groups consist of the bottom and top 30% of the stocks respectively, while the 40% 
in the middle fall into the Medium group. The intersection of the two size portfolio (S and B) and the three 
BM portfolios (L, M and H) yield six benchmark portfolios: S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M and B/H. 
 We form portfolios by shorting firms with lucky listing codes and longing those with unlucky 
listing codes. Our regression model is specified as  
tεthHMLtsSMBtbRMfaftRptR  ,       (1) 
where Rpt is the month-t equally weighted return of the portfolio of firms that is formed at the end of month 
t – 1, and:  
Rft is the risk free rate in month t. It is proxied by the short-term rate in China downloaded from the 
OECD’s website (http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx). This rate is the annualized rate of either the three month 
interbank offer rate attaching to loans amongst banks or the rate associated with Treasury bills, Certificates 
of Deposit or comparable instruments, each of three month maturity;   
RMft is the excess market return measured by the difference between Rmt and Rft, where Rft is the 
risk free rate in month t defined above. Rmt is the market return in month t, computed as the return on the 
value-weighted portfolio of the stocks in the six benchmark portfolios;  
SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms in month t, computed as the 
monthly difference between the simple average of the value-weighted returns on the three small-stock 
portfolios (S/L, S/M, and S/H) and the simple average of the value-weighted returns on the three big-stock 
portfolios (B/L, B/M and B/H).  
HMLt is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks in 
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month t, measured by the monthly difference between the simple average of the value-weighted returns on 
the two high-BM portfolios (S/H and B/H) and the simple average of the value-weighted returns on the two 
low-BM portfolios (S/L and B/L). 
If indeed firms with lucky listing codes underperform firms with unlucky listing codes, we expect 
the intercept term from this model specification to be positive. 
The results are reported in Table 10. Regression 1 reports the results where the portfolios consist of 
firms within three years of their IPOs. We find that the intercept term is 0.5%, significant at the 5% level. 
This positive alpha of a portfolio that shorts firms with lucky listing codes indicates that firms with lucky 
listing codes experience poorer returns than firms with unlucky listing codes within the first three years of 
IPO. 
[Table 10 here] 
Regression 2 reports the results where the portfolios consist of firms more than three years after 
their IPOs. The intercept term is insignificant, suggesting that the return differences disappear after the first 
three years. We further test whether the intercept term is significantly different between the two time 
periods (i.e., the first three years and the years after). Our test statistic is significant at the 5% level, 
providing an affirmative answer.  
In sum, the results based on the Fama-French three-factor model are consistent with the results 
based on firm characteristics model, suggesting that our stock return results are robust to the use of 
alternative asset pricing models. 
 
8.2  The Split-Share Structure Reform 
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the China Securities Regulatory Commission announced a 
Split-Share Structure Reform that aimed to convert all non-tradable shares to publicly tradable shares. 
During the reform the compensation plan offered to tradable shareholders varied across companies, taking 
the forms of cash, warrants, additional shares, and/or asset restructuring (Li et al. 2011; Liao, Liu and Wang 
2014). In our study, stock returns are based on dividends and changes in the share price of publicly tradable 
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shares and thus exclude such additional forms of compensation to holders of tradable shares. This raises the 
concern that some of our returns and valuation multiples are measured with error.  
It is not obvious why such error would be correlated with lucky listing codes (even after controlling 
for several firm characteristics). Nevertheless, as an additional robustness check we replicate our analysis 
using observations not affected by the Split-Share Structure Reform. Specifically, for the analysis related to 
observations within three years after IPO, we obtain a subsample of IPOs that were listed before or in year 
2002 so that the valuation multiples and stock returns within three years after IPO are not affected by the 
Split-Share Structure Reform. Similarly, for the analysis related to observations more than three years after 
IPO, we eliminate all observations in and after 2005. Using this refined sample, we repeated the analyses 
reported in Tables 8 and 9. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.  
 
8.3   Alternative Measures of q and Equity Market-to-Book 
Instead of TQ0 and TQ80, we considered alternative measures of q in the valuation analysis, which 
we call TQ1, TQ2 and TQ70.  TQ1 is the firm’s stock price per share multiplied by its total number of shares, 
plus its book value of total liabilities, divided by its book value of total assets. As mentioned earlier, during 
our sample period, a substantial proportion of shares of listed firms in China were in the form of state shares 
and legal person shares, which could not be traded freely and therefore did not have market prices. TQ1 thus 
assumes that the market price of non-tradable shares is the same as that of tradable shares. TQ2 is the firm’s 
stock price per share multiplied by its total number of tradable shares, plus book value of its non-tradable 
shares and book value of total liabilities, divided by its book value of total assets. TQ2 implicitly assumes 
that non-tradable shares’ market value equals their book value. TQ70 is computed in the same way as TQ0, 
except that, following Chen and Xiong (2001), we apply a 70% discount to the market price of tradable 
shares to estimate the market value of non-tradable shares. The regression results using the above 
alternative valuation measures are qualitatively similar to those reported in Tables 6 and 8. 
 
9. Conclusion 
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The notion that ideas or ideologies have important effects on political and social behavior is 
commonplace. It also seems evident that investment ideas, from the specific, such as whether a given firm’s 
strategy for exploiting the cloud is promising, to the general, such as portfolio theory, contrarianism, or the 
notion that it is good to ‘buy on the dips,’ affect investor behavior. However, there has been little testing of 
how popular theories about how the world works (as contrasted with direct general cognitive biases in 
probability assessments) affect corporate decision making and market prices. 
The Chinese IPO market provides an appealing setting for measuring the effects of one kind of 
investment idea, superstitious beliefs, on financial outcomes. In Chinese culture, certain digits are lucky 
and others unlucky, and this superstition affects behavior (such as the scheduling of the opening of the 2008 
Olympics). We investigate whether numerological superstition is associated with stock mispricing in the 
form of overvaluation of firms with lucky listing codes on China’s stock exchanges; and whether firms 
share or cater to investor superstition by obtaining lucky listing codes.  
We find that the proportion of firms going public with lucky listing codes is greater than would be 
expected based on chance, and the proportion of firms with unlucky listing codes is abnormally low. We 
also find that large firms are more likely than small firms to have lucky listing codes. These findings 
suggest that there is an intentional effort by listing firms to obtain lucky number in their listing codes.  
Furthermore, newly listed firms with lucky listing codes are traded at a premium relative to those 
with unlucky listing codes, after controlling for various characteristics that can affect valuation multiples, 
including leverage, size, growth and operating performance. Consistent with overvaluation of stocks with 
lucky listing codes, firms with lucky listing codes underperform those with unlucky listing codes by about 6% 
per year after appropriate controls.  
We argue that, for several reasons, it is unlikely that the valuation and return results derive from 
endogenous selection of lucky listing codes by managers who expect their firms to be overvalued for 
non-superstitious reasons. For example, past literature suggest that high accruals induce overvaluation, but 
we do not find high-accrual firms disproportionately selecting lucky listing codes. 
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There is also suggestive evidence that the effects we find are not driven by managerial superstition. 
Superstitious managers who like lucky listing codes would presumably also like to obtain other lucky 
numbers for their firms. Using a smaller sample, we find no evidence that firms with lucky listing codes are 
more likely to have lucky telephone/fax number than firms with unlucky listing codes. 
In summary, overall our findings are consistent with firms seeking lucky numbers (either because 
managers share or cater to investor superstition), with market prices being biased by superstitious beliefs 
about lucky numbers, and with investors correcting their expectations over time as uncertainty about the 
new firms are resolved.  
Our findings suggest further possible directions for testing the effects of superstition. Previous 
research has documented that individuals with higher cognitive ability make better financial decisions 
(Grinblatt, Kelohariju and Linnainmaa 2011; Agarwal and Mazumder 2013). It would be interesting to 
explore whether the effects of superstition on financial markets are stronger among investors with lower 
education or cognitive ability  
Arbitrary ideas can cause errors that vary greatly over time and are completely different across 
cultures. Such differences contrast with the effects of inherent cognitive biases, which should tend to 
operate fairly consistently across cultures (though of course culture can modulate their effects). This raises 
the question, for assets that are traded internationally, of whether there is selling by those who find an asset 
unlucky, at a given time, to those who find it lucky (e.g., stocks with 6’s, 8’s, or 13’s, looking across 
cultures with different attitudes toward these numbers).   
 More broadly, such phenomena as the rise of diversified investing over a period of decades, and the 
occurrence of notable events such as the internet boom are arguably caused by the spread of ideas or 
‘popular models’ about investing (see, e.g., Shiller 2005, Bai, Lu and Tao 2009). Our findings within the 
more restricted domain of superstition indicate that investor ideas do matter. This suggests that it will be 
interesting to test in other domains how arbitrary ideas affect capital markets. 
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Figure 1: Tobin’s q for firms with lucky listing codes and firms with unlucky listing codes. 
Figure 1 shows the mean value of TQ80 for firms with lucky listing codes and firms with unlucky listing codes. The former represented by “Lucky” and the latter 
“Unlucky”. The time period covered is from the 12th month to the 36th month after IPO.   
TQ80 is firm’s price per share multiplied by the total number of shares (applying an 80% discount to the market price of tradable shares to compute the market 
value of non-tradable shares), plus book value of long-term debt, inventory, and current liabilities, minus book value of current assets, divided by book value of 
total assets. 
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Table 1: Distribution of listing codes  
This table shows the summary statistics for listing codes of sample firms that went public from 1990 through 2005 in the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange.  
  Shanghai-Listed Firms   Shenzhen-Listed Firms 
Year N Mean Median Min Max  N Mean Median Min Max
1990 7 600638 600652 600601 600656  NA     
1991 0      5 000005 000004 000002 000009
1992 22 600615 600614 600603 600655  18 000150 000017 000006 000505
1993 72 600663 600665 600600 600800  52 000423 000522 000022 000554
1994 67 600835 600835 600801 600868  40 000363 000546 000021 000576
1995 15 600876 600876 600869 600883  9 000401 000582 000010 000586
1996 103 600766 600751 600700 600899  100 000559 000610 000055 000689
1997 85 600195 600093 600051 600799  121 000700 000733 000059 001696
1998 53 600152 600160 600001 600218  53 000802 000827 000065 001896
1999 45 600189 600205 600003 600359  52 000906 000922 000090 000959
2000 87 600274 600278 600008 600500  49 000758 000969 000070 000999
2001 78 600395 600383 600010 600599  1 000725 000725 000725 000725
2002 69 600492 600526 600026 600598  1 000875 000875 000875 000875
2003 65 600413 600449 600004 600900  0 
2004 61 600677 600572 600022 600997  39 001970 002019 000100 002038
2005 3 600490 600472 600027 600970  12 002045 002045 002039 002050
Total 832 600487 600504 600001 600997   552 000748 000699 000002 002050
Table 2 Summary Statistics 
This table presents the mean and median values of variables measuring firm characteristics within three 
years of IPO for firms with lucky listing codes and firms with unlucky listing codes. An unlucky listing 
code contains the unlucky digit 4 but not any of the lucky digits 6, 8 or 9; a lucky listing code contains 
one or more of the lucky digits 6, 8 or 9, but not the unlucky digit 4. TQ0 is firm’s price per share 
multiplied by the total number of shares, plus its book value of long-term debt, inventory, and current 
liabilities, minus its book value of current assets, divided by book value of total assets. TQ80 is similar 
to TQ0, except that we apply an 80% discount to the market price of tradable shares to compute the 
market value of non-tradable shares. MB is the firm's price per share multiplied by the total number of 
shares at the end of the month divided by the book value of equity at the beginning of the year. 
OpProfitMargin is the firm’s total operating profit (income from main operations plus income from 
other operations) divided by its total sales. Cash ROA is the firm’s cash flow from operating activities 
divided by its total assets at the beginning of the year. Lev is the firm’s total debts (short-term debts plus 
long-term liabilities due within one year plus long-term debts) divided by its total assets. Tangibility is 
the book value of the firm’s tangible assets (total assets minus intangible assets) divided by its total 
sales during the period. Growth represents the firm’s current year sales growth ratio. Size is the natural 
log of total sales.  
  Unlucky  Lucky          
Variables Mean Median  Mean Median   t z 
TQ0 2.233 1.941  2.692 2.297  -13.67 *** -14.45 *** 
TQ80 0.928 0.833  1.142 0.958  -13.36 *** -12.58 *** 
MB 4.085 3.608  4.658 3.962  -9.79 *** -10.58 *** 
OpProfitMargin 0.223 0.198  0.227 0.199  -0.31  -0.32  
Cash ROA 0.095 0.075  0.093 0.061  0.31  0.57  
Lev 0.201 0.193  0.204 0.192  -0.35  0.33  
Tangibility 2.714 2.265  2.722 2.124  -0.12  0.74  
Growth 0.229 0.167  0.226 0.131  0.12  0.51  
Size 19.677 19.638  19.806 19.742   -1.90 * -1.78 * 
Note: The asterisks following t (z) indicate the significance level of t-statistics (Wilcoxon rank-sum z 
statistics) of the difference between the two subsamples. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 Frequency of lucky/unlucky/other listing codes 
This table presents the distribution of firms with lucky or unlucky, or mixed/neutral listing codes 
(labeled “Other”). An unlucky listing code contains the unlucky digit 4 but not any of the lucky digits 6, 
8 or 9; a lucky listing code contains one or more of the lucky digits 6, 8 or 9, but not the unlucky digit 4. 
Mixed/neutral listing codes are those that do not fall into either of these categories. The first digit of all 
Shanghai-listed firms, which is 6, is not counted when we make the above-mentioned classifications. 
‘Actual (%)’ reports the actual proportions of firms falling into the above-mentioned categories, while 
‘expected (%)’ reports the expected proportions assuming random assignment of listing codes.  
  Shanghai (N = 832)   Shenzhen (N = 552)   
 Actual Expected (3 digits)  Actual Expected (4 digits) 
  (%) (%)   (%) (%)   
Unlucky 6.7% 12.7% ### 9.2% 11.1%  
Lucky 55.2% 51.4% ## 64.3% 52.7% ### 
Other 38.1% 35.9%  26.4% 36.3% ### 
       
Total 100% 100% *** 100% 100% *** 
 
Note: #, ##, and ###  denote significant difference between actual and expected proportions at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively, using a binomial test. *, **, and *** denote significant difference 
between the actual and the expected overall distribution at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, 
using a Chi-squared test. 
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Table 4 Frequency of listing codes with a sequence of (un)lucky numbers and (un)lucky-end 
number and frequency of lucky telephone/fax numbers 
Panel A and B present the distributions of listing codes with a sequence of (un)lucky numbers or a(n) 
(un)lucky-end number respectively. ‘Actual (%)’ reports the actual proportions of firms falling into the 
above-mentioned categories, while ‘expected (%)’ reports the expected proportions assuming random 
assignment of listing codes. Panel C reports the frequency of having a lucky telephone/fax number 
separately for firms with lucky listing codes and firms with unlucky listing codes in the IPO year. Lucky 
telephone/fax numbers are defined in the same way as lucky listing codes. Specifically, the firm is 
deemed to have a lucky telephone number/fax number if the last four digits of the firm’s telephone 
number/fax number contain one or more of the lucky numbers 6, 8 and 9, but not the unlucky number 4.  
Panel A Proportion of listing codes with at least two consecutive (un)lucky numbers 
  Shanghai (N = 832)  Shenzhen (N = 552) 
 Actual Expected (3 digits)  Actual 
Expected 
(4 digits) 
  (%) (%)  (%)       (%)   
At least 2 consecutive lucky numbers 15.6% 13.5% # 18.1% 17.0%  
At least 2 consecutive unlucky numbers 0.2% 1.3% ### 0.4% 1.3% ## 
Panel B Proportion of firms with (un)lucky numbers in the last digit of the listing code 
  Shanghai (N = 832)  Shenzhen (N = 552) 
 Actual Expected (3 digits)  Actual 
Expected 
(4 digits) 
  (%) (%)  (%)       (%)   
Lucky end 26.4% 24.3%  30.4% 21.9% ### 
Unlucky end 1.8% 4.9% ### 2.9% 3.4%   
 
Panel C: Probability of obtaining lucky telephone/fax numbers for firms with lucky listing codes  
and firms with unlucky listing codes 
 
Listing code   Pr(Lucky Tel)  Pr(Lucky Fax)   N
Lucky 0.761 0.741 498
Unlucky 0.814 0.814 59
Lucky - Unlucky -0.053 -0.073
p value of the difference 0.3681   0.2249     
Note: #, ##, and ###  denote significant difference between actual and expected proportions at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level respectively, using a binomial test.  
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Table 5 Who gets lucky listing codes? 
This table reports results of logit regressions for the prediction of lucky listing codes. The dependent 
variable, Lucky, is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm’s listing code contains one or more of 
the lucky digits 6, 8 or 9, but not the unlucky digit 4, and 0 otherwise.  Top1 is the percentage of shares 
held by the largest shareholder. Top1_state is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s largest direct 
shareholder is a state-owned asset management bureau/company, and zero otherwise. TAccrual is total 
accruals, computed as net income minus cash flow from operating activities divided by total assets, in 
the fiscal year when the firm goes public. Other control variables are as defined in Table 2.  ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 
Top1 0.006 0.007 
 (0.83) (0.84) 
Top1_state -0.163 -0.265 
 (0.59) (0.83) 
Tangibility 0.055 0.077 
 (0.76) (1.20) 
OpProfitMargin 0.563 0.459 
 (0.67) (0.40) 
Lev -0.131 -0.218 
 (0.13) (0.22) 
Growth -0.104 -0.076 
 (0.49) (0.34) 
Size 0.219** 0.221*** 
 (2.03) (2.59) 
TAccrual -0.411 -0.995 
 (0.31) (0.84) 
Industry Effects No Yes 
   
N 847 801 
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.05 
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Table 6 Valuation analysis 
This table reports multivariate regression results for the sample consisting of firms with lucky listing 
codes and firms with unlucky listing codes. Results based on observations within 3 years after IPO are 
presented in Panel A, while those based on observations more than 3 years after IPO are presented in 
Panel B. The dependent variable of the regressions is the firm’s market valuation, measured by TQ0, 
TQ80 and MB, as defined in Table 2. The independent variables are defined as follows: Lucky is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm’s listing code contains one or more of the lucky digits 6, 8 or 
9, but not the unlucky digit 4, and 0 otherwise. Other control variables are as defined in Table 2. 
Industry dummies are included in the regressions to control for industry fixed effects. The t-statistics, 
shown in parentheses, are after allowing double-clustering by calendar month and firm. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
   3 years after IPO   > 3 years after IPO 
TQ0 TQ80 MB TQ0 TQ80 MB 
(1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b) 
Lucky 0.385*** 0.178*** 0.505** 0.132 0.011 -0.178 
(2.61) (2.69) (2.13) (1.17) (0.18) (0.58) 
Lev -1.890*** -0.316** 0.454 -1.234*** -0.11 1.112* 
(6.33) (2.22) (0.87) (4.89) (0.79) (1.90) 
Growth 0.339*** 0.187*** 0.592*** 0.323*** 0.176*** 0.559*** 
(4.03) (4.07) (3.64) (5.63) (6.41) (3.88) 
Tangibility -0.133*** -0.065*** -0.202*** -0.123*** -0.065*** -0.224*** 
(7.30) (7.27) (5.53) (8.36) (8.38) (6.43) 
Cash ROA -0.137 -0.040 0.728 0.617 0.34 2.153** 
(0.32) (0.18) (0.91) (1.50) (1.49) (2.31) 
Size -0.446*** -0.234*** -0.599*** -0.657*** -0.345*** -1.134*** 
(9.70) (10.15) (6.94) (14.05) (14.99) (10.68) 
Constant 11.263*** 5.728*** 15.534*** 16.242*** 8.195*** 27.624*** 
(11.90) (12.27) (8.97) (15.39) (16.15) (11.72) 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value of test of equal coefficients on Lucky between 
 (1a) and (1b) 0.367  
(2a) and (2b) 0.006  
(3a) and (3b) <0.001 
        
N 25,645 25,645 25,645 43,702 43,702 43,702 
Adjusted R2 0.171 0.151 0.113   0.237 0.245 0.172 
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Table 7 Stock return analysis – firm characteristics regression 
This table reports multivariate regression results for the sample consisting of firms with lucky listing 
codes and firms with unlucky listing codes. Results based on observations within 3 years after IPO are 
presented in Column 1, while those based on observations more than 3 years after IPO are presented in 
Column 2. The dependent variable of the regressions is the firm’s monthly abnormal return, avretn_div, 
computed as the firm’s monthly return minus value-weighted market return. Lucky is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if the firm’s listing code contains one or more of the lucky digits 6, 8 or 9, but not the 
unlucky digit 4, and 0 otherwise. LgBM is the natural log of the ratio of book value of equity at the end 
of the year to the sum of the market value of tradable shares and the estimated market value of 
non-tradable shares at the end of the month, assuming an 80% discount relative to tradable shares. 
LgMV is the natural log of the sum of the market value of tradable shares and the estimated market 
value of non-tradable shares at the end of the month, assuming an 80% discount relative to tradable 
shares. Industry dummies are included in the regressions to control for the industry fixed effect. The 
t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are after allowing double-clustering by calendar month and firm. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 ≤ 3 Years aft IPO   > 3 Years after IPO 
 (1)   (2) 
Lucky -0.005** 0.000 
(2.63) (0.11) 
LgBM -0.019*** -0.009*** 
(7.45) (3.64) 
LgMV 0.006** 0.010*** 
(2.35) (2.80) 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
p-value of test of equal coefficients on  Lucky between (1) and (2) 0.038  
N 31,649 52,174 
Adjusted R2 0.019   0.015 
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Table 8 Robustness check – valuation analysis 
This table reports multivariate regression results for the sample consisting of firms with lucky listing 
codes and firms with unlucky listing codes. Results based on observations within 3 years after IPO are 
presented in Panel A, while those based on observations more than 3 years after IPO are presented in 
Panel B. The dependent variable of the regressions is the firm’s market valuation, measured by TQ0, 
TQ80 and MB, as defined in Table 2. The independent variables are defined as follows: Lucky is a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the firm’s listing code contains one or more of the lucky digits 6, 8 or 
9, but not the unlucky digit 4, and 0 otherwise. Top1 is the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder. Top1_state is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s largest direct shareholder is a 
state-owned asset management bureau/company, and zero otherwise. TAccrual is total accruals, 
computed as net income minus cash flow from operating activities divided by total assets, in the fiscal 
year when the firm goes public. Other control variables are as defined in Table 2. Industry dummies are 
included in the regressions to control for the industry fixed effects. The t-statistics, shown in 
parentheses, are after allowing double-clustering by calendar month and firm. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
   3 years after IPO  > 3 years after IPO 
TQ0 TQ80 MB TQ0 TQ80 MB 
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (1b) (2b) (3b) 
Lucky 0.373*** 0.177*** 0.489** 0.124 0.024 -0.209 
(2.81) (2.93) (2.22) (1.09) (0.40) (0.67) 
Lev -0.998*** 0.033 1.631*** -1.061*** -0.129 1.273** 
(3.38) (0.22) (2.97) (4.09) (0.90) (2.12) 
Growth 0.301*** 0.171*** 0.536*** 0.305*** 0.170*** 0.525*** 
(3.58) (3.54) (3.45) (5.21) (6.04) (3.65) 
top1 -0.001 -0.002** 0.001 0.004** -0.004*** 0.009** 
(0.30) (2.05) (0.02) (2.00) (3.44) (2.04) 
top1_state -0.198** -0.073 -0.244 -0.182** -0.035 -0.403* 
(2.06) (1.58) (1.37) (2.12) (0.84) (1.90) 
Tangibility -0.159*** -0.074*** -0.235*** -0.128*** -0.064*** -0.226***
(7.51) (6.98) (5.20) (8.38) (8.01) (6.34) 
OpProfitMargin 2.574*** 1.030*** 3.925*** 1.233*** 0.650*** 1.533*** 
(8.04) (6.52) (6.10) (4.52) (4.95) (2.58) 
Cash ROA 1.015** 0.430* 1.986** 0.785* 0.342 2.115** 
(2.30) (1.79) (2.30) (1.91) (1.53) (2.25) 
Size -0.484*** -0.241*** -0.637*** -0.652*** -0.317*** -1.121***
(11.67) (11.64) (8.06) (13.77) (13.72) (10.61) 
TAccrual 2.598*** 1.176*** 2.439* -0.108 -0.362 -1.853** 
(3.90) (3.00) (1.88) (0.26) (1.21) (2.12) 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value of test of equal coefficients on Lucky between 
 (1a) and (1b) 0.048  
(2a) and (2b) 0.001  
(3a) and (3b) <0.001 
N 25,621 25,621 25,621 43,702 43,702 43,702 
Adjusted R2 0.254 0.214 0.167   0.251 0.265 0.181 
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Table 9 Robustness check – stock return analysis 
This table reports multivariate regression results for the sample consisting of firms with lucky listing 
codes and firms with unlucky listing codes. Results based on observations within 3 years after IPO are 
presented in Column 1, while those based on observations more than 3 years after IPO are presented in 
Column 2. The dependent variable of the regressions is the firm monthly abnormal return, avretn_div, 
computed as the firm’s monthly return minus value-weighted market return. Lucky is a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if the firm’s listing code contains one or more of the lucky digits 6, 8 or 9, but not the 
unlucky digit 4, and 0 otherwise. LgBM is the natural log of the ratio of book value of equity at the end 
of the year to the sum of the market value of tradable shares and the estimated market value of 
non-tradable shares at the end of the month, assuming an 80% discount relative to tradable shares. 
LgMV is the natural log of the sum of the market value of tradable shares and the estimated market 
value of non-tradable shares at the end of the month, assuming an 80% discount relative to tradable 
shares. Other control variables are as defined in Table 2. Top1 is the percentage of shares held by the 
largest shareholder. Top1_state is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm’s largest direct shareholder 
is a state-owned asset management bureau/company, and zero otherwise. TAccrual is total accruals, 
computed as net income minus cash flow from operating activities divided by total assets, in the fiscal 
year when the firm goes public. Industry dummies are included in the regressions to control for the 
industry fixed effect. The t-statistics, shown in parentheses, are after allowing double-clustering by 
calendar month and firm. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
  
≤ 3 Years after IPO 
 (1) 
> 3 Years after IPO 
(2) 
Lucky -0.005** -0.001 
 (2.31) (0.47) 
LgBM -0.020*** -0.009*** 
 (7.66) (3.82) 
LgMV 0.007*** 0.010*** 
 (3.00) (2.78) 
Top1 0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.67) (4.07) 
Top1_state 0.004*** -0.002 
 (3.10) (1.40) 
TAccrual -0.011 -0.002 
 (1.47) (0.48) 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
 
p-value of test of equal coefficients on   Lucky between (1) and (2) 
       
0.098 
N 30,506 52,166 
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.015 
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Table 10 Robustness check – stock return analysis with Fama-French three-factor regressions 
This table shows the results based on Fama-French three-factor regressions. Column (1) reports the 
results from the portfolio formed monthly by shorting firms with lucky listing codes and longing those 
with unlucky listing codes within 3 years after IPO. Column (2) reports the results from the portfolio 
formed monthly by shorting firms with lucky listing codes and longing those with unlucky listing codes 
more than 3 years after IPO. The dependent variable is the portfolio’s monthly return minus the risk free 
rate. The risk free rate is proxied by the short-term rate in China downloaded from the OECD’s website 
(http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx). This rate is the annualized rate of either the three month interbank 
offer rate attaching to loans amongst banks or the rate associated with Treasury bills, Certificates of 
Deposit or comparable instruments, each of three month maturity.  Following Fama and French (1993), 
we rank all firms listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchanges  into two groups, small (S) and big 
( B), according to their market value (computed as the stock price as of the end of June multiplied by the 
number of shares outstanding).  We also sort the Chinese listed firms into three groups, Low (L), 
Medium (M), and High (H), according to the book-to-market ratio (BM). BM is computed as the book 
value of equity for the fiscal year divided by market equity at the end of the fiscal year, which is 
December 31 for all Chinese listed firms. The Low and High groups consist of the bottom and top 30% 
of the stocks respectively, while the 40% in the middle fall into the Medium group. The intersection of 
the two size portfolio (S and B) and the three BM portfolios (L, M and H) yield six benchmark 
portfolios: S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M and B/H. RMf is the excess market return, computed as the return 
on the value-weighted portfolio of the stocks in the six benchmark portfolios minus the risk free rate. 
SMB is the monthly difference between the simple average of the value-weighted returns on the three 
small-stock portfolios (S/L, S/M, and S/H) and the simple average of the value-weighted returns on the 
three big-stock portfolios (B/L, B/M and B/H). HML is the monthly difference between the simple 
average of the value-weighted returns on the two high-BM portfolios (S/H and B/H) and the simple 
average of the value-weighted returns on the two low-BM portfolios (S/L and B/L). The t-statistics, 
shown in parentheses, are after allowing clustering by calendar month. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
  
 3 years after IPO 
(1) 
> 3 years after IPO 
(2) 
RMf 0.028 0.133*** 
(1.51) (4.97) 
SMB -0.098*** -0.043 
(3.72) (0.53) 
HML -0.023 0.310*** 
(0.80) (6.75) 
Intercept 0.005** -0.004 
(1.98) (1.27) 
 
p-value of test of equal coefficients on  Lucky between (1) and (2)    
 
0.016 
 
N 168 137 
Adjusted R2 0.074 0.301 
 
 
